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Casenote
DAMAGES-RECOVERY FOR CHILD'S WRONGFUL DEATH
Seiders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686 (1973).
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Selders v. Armentrout1 over-
turned approximately forty years of decisional law,2 governing the
damages recoverable for the death of a minor child under Ne-
braska's wrongful death statutes.3 For a four-man majority, Jus-
tice McCown wrote:
We hold that the measure of damages for the wrongful death of
a minor child should be extended to include the loss of the society,
comfort, and companionship of the child. To the extent this holding
is in conflict with prior decisions of this court, they are overruled.4
Selders was an appeal by parents from a verdict finding the
defendants negligent, and awarding the parents damages for the
wrongful deaths of three minor children. The jury had been in-
structed that in addition to medical and funeral expenses, damages
should include the dollar value of the services and contributions
which the parents could have expected to receive from the chil-
dren. From this sum was to be substracted the amount the par-
ents would have expended in supporting the children. 5 The ver-
dict returned represented the exact total of the medical and fu-
neral expenses.
At common law, there could be no civil recovery for wrongful
death.0 This view was generally accepted in most United States
jurisdictions.7 The rule was subjected to much criticism, largely
1. 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686 (1973).
2. Prior to 1919, the "procedural" section of the wrongful death statute
read in part: "[T]he jury may give such damages as they shall
deem a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary
injuries resulting from such death. . .." Neb. Laws c. 47, § 2 at
190 (1907). In 1919, the legislature removed the word "pecuniary",
changing this provision to "The verdict or judgment should be for the
amount of damages which the persons in whose behalf the action is
brought have sustained." Neb. Laws c. 92, § 1, at 236 (1919). Since
1919 recovery has been limited to pecuniary loss by judicial construc-
tion only.
3. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-809 (Reissue 1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-810
(Supp. 1972).
4. 190 Neb. at 280, 207 N.W.2d at 689.
5. Id. at 275-76, 207 N.W.2d at 687.
6. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
7. S. SpEIsE, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:3 (1966).
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because it provided no recovery against a wrongdoer who killed
his victim, while holding him liable for mere injury.8 Today, stat-
utes have modified the common-law rule in all states.9 A number
of states have only statutes which allow causes of action to survive
the victim's death.10 The more common provision is a wrongful
death statute creating a wholly new cause of action unrelated to
any the decedent may have had during his lifetime." The two
types of statutes often co-exist within a jurisdiction.' 2 Nebraska's
wrongful death statute13 is of the latter type, which are derived
generally from Lord Campbell's Act.14 Such wrongful death stat-
utes create new causes of actions in behalf of named survivors.
They vary widely as to proper beneficiaries and plaintiffs, and as
to how damages are to be computed and distributed. 15
Under some wrongful death statutes, damages are measured by
the loss to the decedent's estate.' Others base damages upon the
loss to the beneficiaries by reason of the wrongful death, as does
Nebraska's act.' 7 Most states following the loss to survivors theory
have restricted recovery to pecuniary loss only, either by express
statutory provision' s or by judicial construction. 9 Nebraska
8. Id. § 1:6. See also W. PRossER, LAW OF ToRTs § 127, at 902 (4th ed.
1971).
9. Note, Torts-Wrongful Death-Unborn Child-The Estate of an Unborn
Child Has a Cause of Action for Wrongful Death, 70 MICH. L. REV.
729, 733 (1972).
10. Comment, Damages for the Wrongful Death of Children, 22 U. CHi.
L. REv. 538, 539 (1955).
11. Note 9 supra, at 733.
12. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1402 to -1414 (Reissue 1964). The problems
caused by the presence of both types of statutes within a jurisdiction is
beyond the scope of this note. See Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort
Actions and the Action for Wrongful Death-A Survey and a Pro-
posal, 16 TUL. L. REV. 386 (1942). Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb.
232, 280 N.W. 290 (1938), allows joinder of both in separate courts.
13. Note 3 supra.
14. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
15. See Decof, Damages in Actions for Wrongful Death of Children, 47
N. D. LAw. 197, 213-228 (1971), for a compilation of statutory provi-
sions relating to damages recoverable. See also statutes collected in
S. SPEISER, supra note 7, §§ 3:1, 11:16.
16. S. SPEisE, supra note 7, § 3:2. See Lorenzen v. Continental Baking
Co., 180 Neb. 23, 141 N.W.2d 163 (1966) (applying Iowa law), for a
comparison of damages recoverable under a "loss to survivors" statute
and under a "loss to estate" provision.
17. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-810 (Supp. 1972), provides in part, "The verdict
or judgment should be for the amount of damages which the persons
in whose behalf the action is brought have sustained."
18. S. SPEIsER, supra note 7, § 3: 1 at 58.
19. Id.
DAMACTME
would have been placed in the latter category20 prior to Selders.
Justice McCown, in Selders, viewed the "pecuniary loss" limi-
tation as being of judicial origin only. He read the statutory use
of the word "pecuniary" as being strictly limited to the method of
distributing the proceeds of a wrongful death action, and inappli-
cable to the determination of what elements of damage were re-
coverable.
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice White argued in Selders
that the limitation of recovery to pecuniary loss was not a rule
of judicial construction, but required by the statute.21 He based
this argument upon a 1945 amendment to § 30-810. This amend-
ment, however, did not alter the general language of § 30-810
relating to damages recoverable. 22 Prior to 1945, § 30-810 had
provided that the amount recovered in a wrongful death action
should be "distributed as personal property of an estate un-
der inheritance laws ... ". ,23 The amendment changed the method
of distribution of proceeds: "The avails thereof shall be paid to
and distributed among the widow or widower and next of kin in
the proportion that the pecuniary loss suffered by each bears to the
total pecuniary loss suffered by all such persons. 24
One is inclined to wonder, along with Chief Justice White,
why the legislature would make this change if it intended to per-
mit recovery for more than pecuniary loss. Nevertheless, a lit-
eral reading leads to the conclusion that "pecuniary loss" is stat-
utorily binding only as to the method to be used in apportion-
ing the proceeds of the action. Since the 1919 amendment 25 the Ne-
braska Supreme Court itself appears to have never treated the pe-
cuniary loss rule as statutory. A case perhaps supporting Jus-
tice McCown's reading of the 1945 amendment 26 is In re Estate of
Lucht,27 decided in 1.941. There a husband desired a share of the
recovery for his minor son's wrongful death, yet the husband had
lived apart from his family since the son's birth and had never
contributed to his support. The father sought a share simply on
20. See note 2 supra. See also Fisher v. Trester, 119 Neb. 529, 533, 229
N.W. 901, 903 (1928).
21. 190 Neb. at 281-83, 207 N.W.2d at 690-91.
22. Neb. Laws c. 66, § 1 at 263 (1945).
23. Neb. Laws c. 75, § 1 at 265 (1937).
24. Neb. Laws c. 66, § 1 at 263 (1945).
25. See note 2 supra. See also Elliot v. City of University Place, 102 Neb.
273, 166 N.W. 621 (1918), where the court regards the rule as statu-
tory.
26. 190 Neb. at 276, 277, 207 N.W.2d at 687, 688.
27. 139 Neb. 139, 296 N.W. 749 (1941).
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the basis of his relationship to the decedent, showing no pecuniary
loss. The court refused him a share of the recovery, stating:
We hold that the amount recovered by the personal representative
of a deceased, under the provisions of section 30-810, Comp. St. 1929,
as amended by chapter 92, Laws 1919, shall be paid to and dis-
tributed among such of the widow, widower and next of kin of such
deceased as suffer a pecuniary loss by the death of such deceased. 28
The court went on to say:
The finding of which of the surviving spouse and next of kin suf-
fered a pecuniary loss . . . is left to the court, for determination
subsequent to the recovery of the amount to be distributed .... 29
It is at least arguable, in light of In re Lucht's Estate, that the 1945
amendment added the reference to "pecuniary loss" to insure that
those who have shown little involvement with the decedent in the
past not share in the proceeds of a wrongful death action.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has previously allowed recovery
of other items of damage than simply the lost services of a dece-
dent. In Draper v. Tucker,30 the court allowed recovery of the
probable contributions from a child beyond his majority. The
court has also permitted recovery of medical and funeral expenses
expended by the survivors. 31 The court has indicated that a sur-
viving husband or wife may recover for the lost companionship
of a spouse to the extent that
[t]he evidence shows a reasonable probability that such service
and companionship afforded the survivor was of such a character
that it would be of advantage to such survivor, and that a disal-
lowance thereof would cause a pecuniary loss to him or her.3 2
It appears, then, that the Nebraska Supreme Court has
not generally looked upon recovery for lost companionship as be-
ing absolutely taboo, but rather as an item about which the jury
28. Id. at 145, 296 N.W. at 752.
29. Id. at 146, 296 N.W. at 752.
30. 69 Neb. 434, 95 N.W. 1026 (1903).
31. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Selders, 187 Neb. 342, 190 N.W.2d
789 (1971). In regard to this case, see dissent of Clinton, J. in the
principal case, 190 Neb. at 288, 207 N.W.2d at 693, relating to the doc-
trine of "law of the case."
32. Ensor v. Compton, 110 Neb. 522, 524 194 N.W. 458, 459 (1923).
This case closely followed the removal of the "pecuniary" limit from
the statute. See note 2 supra. See also Wood v. City of Omaha,
87 Neb. 213, 127 N.W. 174 (1910); Dow v. Legg, 120 Neb. 271, 231
N.W. 747 (1930), indicated that a child could recover for the lost
guidance and companionship of a deceased father. Justice Mc-
Cown's reliance on Ensor is at least partially misplaced. The case
still speaks of pecuniary loss.
DAMAGES
should not be free to speculate.33 However, the court has not in
the past found itself strictly bound, at least when the death of a
child is involved, to proven damages. In Draper v. Tucker34 the
court said:
But a verdict for only $10, for the pecuniary loss caused by the
death of a bright, intelligent child, three years and four months
old, shocks the sensibilities of all fair-minded persons, and if any
recovery is to be had in this case, . . . it should be for a reason-
able and substantial sum.35
Mabe v. Gross36 involved a suit in behalf of a three-year-old
daughter arising from the death of her divorced father. There
was no proof of any pecuniary loss. The court ruled that the mere
existence of a duty to support is enough to free the jury to com-
pute pecuniary loss.
3 7
In Nebraska, as in most states where loss to survivors has been
restricted to pecuniary loss, the damages have been computed by
adding up the value of the future services and contributions the
survivors could have expected to receive. From this is sub-
tracted the amount the survivors would have expended in support.
This method has some basis in reality in the case of a dead hus-
band with a demonstrated record of contributions. In the case
of a minor child, it is purely speculative, even though restricted
to "pecuniary loss." Therefore, any recovery at all for the death
of a minor child today probably indicates that the jury has con-
sidered something other than "pecuniary loss."
The traditional method of computing damages for the death of
33. This appears to be one of Chief Justice White's chief objections to
the majority opinion. 190 Neb. at 286, 207 N.W.2d at 692. At one
point Justice White seems to misread the majority. He says,
190 Neb. at 283, 207 N.W.2d at 691, that the majority has forbidden
introduction of any evidence of the "pecuniary nature of a child's
services, parent's expenses, etc." He indicates a belief that all guid-
ance for the jury has been taken away. What Justice McCown was
doing, 190 Neb. at 280, 207 N.W.2d at 689, was rejecting the "lost in-
vestment" method of computing pecuniary loss which was adopted by
the Michigan Supreme Court in Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331,
105 N.W.2d 118 (1960). Under the "lost investment" method, dam-
ages are computed by adding up the expenses the parent had al-
ready incurred to the date of death. Justice McCown has merely
rejected evidence of past expenses. Evidence of the value of future
services and parental expenses will still be needed in Nebraska, as
actual pecuniary loss is still a proper element of damages.
34. 69 Neb. 434, 95 N.W. 1026 (1903).
35. Id. at 440, 95 N.W. at 1028.
36. 167 Neb. 593, 94 N.W.2d 12 (1959).
37. Id. at 599, 94 N.W.2d at 17. The court emphasized the lack of need
for precise proof of loss. Id. at 597-99, 94 N.W.2d at 16-17.
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a minor child was applicable only, if ever, in a day long gone.38
Were the rule strictly applied, verdicts such as that in Draper v.
Tucker 39 should be commonplace. It seems safe to assume that in
allowing an action for the death of a minor child, the legislature in-
tended that there should be some recovery. The decision of the
Nebraska Supreme Court in Selders v. Armentrout is statutorily
permissible. It is desirable as it will allow juries to fulfill the
legislative intent without resort to legal fictions. Although allow-
ing recovery for the lost society, comfort, and companionship of
a minor child may, to some extent, be an attempt to compensate
an emotional loss monetarily, 40 past cases show that juries have
been doing so for some time without guidance as to computation.
With this decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court joins a growing
number of other state courts41 which have recognized that the
loss of a child is only incidentally, at best, a pecuniary loss. Seld-
ers v. Armentrout recognizes that if a parent is to be compensated
for what he or she has lost, as the legislature has intended, then
elements of damage other than those strictly monetary must be
included.
Arthur R. Langvardt '74
38. 190 Neb. at 278, 207 N.W.2d at 688.
39. It is a rare case today where the contributions of a child could
honestly be shown to exceed the cost of rearing him to majority.
See Comment, supra note 10, at 541-42.
40. See 190 Neb. at 281, 207 N.W.2d at 690 (White, C.J. dissenting).
41. See Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1971); Stang
v. Hertz Corp., 81 N.M. 348, 467 P.2d 14 (1970); Lockhart v. Besel,
71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967); Boies v. Cole, 99 Ariz. 198,
407 P.2d 917 (1965); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d
355 (1961).
